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Executive Summary
Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s emergence as an independent state, 
Moscow is no longer America’s strategic rival.  Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it 
become a friend.  Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, 
but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations.  A better-managed bilateral relationship is 
critical for the advancement of America’s vital national interests.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia’s President next year 
does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia’s national 
interests with respect to the United States.  Still, at a minimum, Russia’s rhetoric vis-à-vis America 
and the West may become tougher under Putin.  Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper 
focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. 
policymakers.
This report, the result of deliberations by a distinguished working group of former senior officials 
and military officers, business leaders, and top experts, analyzes the U.S.-Russia relationship through 
the lens of American national interests; argues that Russia is a pivotal country in promoting these 
U.S. national interests; and offers prescriptions for U.S. policy toward Russia in the period ahead. 
We believe Russia must be a top priority for the United States because its conduct can have a 
profound impact on America’s vital national interests:
• Nuclear weapons
• Non-proliferation
• Counter-terrorism
• Geopolitics, including managing China’s emergence as a global power
• Afghanistan
• Energy
• International finance, in the G8 and the G20
• Strategic geography
Reviewing these areas makes clear that Russia’s choices and actions impact the full range of vital U.S. 
national interests significantly and directly.  Few other nations are as important to the United States. 
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The Obama Administration’s reset policy has contributed to significant improvements in the U.S.-
Russian relations. Unfortunately, the reset is still fragile and what remains to be done is likely to be 
much more difficult than what has been accomplished so far.  Twice before, under the Clinton and 
George W. Bush Administrations, the U.S.and Russia moved in the direction of a new and different 
relationship—yet both times, the efforts stalled.
In some respects, the difficulty in sustaining improvements in the U.S.-Russia relationship has had 
less to do with specific differences and more to do with an inability to break down lasting mutual 
distrust. This suspicion of one another’s motives may in fact be a greater obstacle to cooperation 
than sometimes divergent national interests and values. 
Domestic politics in each country makes this even more challenging.  When U.S. and Russian 
leaders seek to portray their improving relations as important diplomatic successes, their political 
opponents naturally take a contrary view. 
More generally, even in the absence of partisan political differences, U.S. leaders have often fueled 
unrealistic expectations about the U.S.-Russian relationship and developments in Russia.  This leads 
inevitably to disillusionment and frustration that weaken any administration’s ability to conduct a 
sustainable policy in service of U.S. national interests.
Because U.S. and Russian interests and values are not aligned, and perspectives and strategies are often 
even farther apart, Washington and Moscow at best will make progress in some areas and see setbacks 
in others—a reality that makes mutual trust even more important for managing differences.
Finally, given the disparities between U.S. and Russian interests and governance, lasting cooperation 
is unlikely if not impossible without determined leadership from far-sighted leaders in the executive 
and legislative branches, particularly the President.  And even a purposeful U.S. policy is in itself 
insufficient to ensure sustainable cooperation in the absence of Russian efforts to make a cooperative 
relationship succeed.  Having worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group 
are painfully aware of how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be.
Selected Policy Prescriptions from the Report
• The United States should engage Russia to develop and implement a jointly produced 
and concrete roadmap with a firm timeline to attaining the highest possible standards 
of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) everywhere in the world. 
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• The United States should engage Russia to orchestrate international consensus that there 
will be no new national HEU enrichment or plutonium reprocessing.
• The United States should explore with Russia a new strategic stability concept that reflects 
the fact that Washington and Moscow are no longer enemies prepared to destroy each 
other, but rather potential partners.
• The next round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction should combine deployed and non-
deployed weapons to lower the ceiling of strategic warheads to 1,000 or fewer. 
• In discussing tactical nuclear weapons with Russia, the United States should focus first on 
negotiating consolidation, transparency and verification measures rather than reductions.
• The United States should proceed with developing anti-missile systems in Europe and 
globally, in line with the realistic assessment of existing and future threats and available 
technologies and funds.
• The United States should be prepared to launch a genuine and substantive dialogue first 
with its NATO allies and then with Russia about a new inclusive European security system 
that would give Russia a meaningful voice and that would include an effective rapid 
response mechanism of conflict prevention, interdiction and resolution.
• In making major international policy decisions, the United States should consider whether U.S. 
actions could consolidate Russian-Chinese cooperation at the expense of wider U.S. goals.
• As long as it appears feasible, achieving broader U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Russia should have 
priority over expanding NATO membership in ways that could undermine cooperation on 
greater U.S. priorities.
• The United States should raise the priority of the U.S.-Russian energy dialogue and focus 
on removing obstacles to bilateral investment, trade, and research.
• The United States should press Russia to improve investment conditions in the energy 
sector and in Russia’s overall economy and make clear to Moscow that mistreating U.S. and 
Western companies damages Russia’s investment climate and international image, and is an 
obstacle to improving relations with the United States.
• The United States should strengthen joint capabilities with Russia to collect and analyze 
intelligence on terrorist threats, including nuclear, biological, and conventional catastrophic 
terrorism threats to the two nations and their allies.
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• The United States should seek to harmonize U.S. and Russian government lists of terrorist 
organizations subject to sanctions.
• The United States should engage Russia in pressing Pakistan to end sanctuaries and 
support for groups fighting in Afghanistan and for promoting a diplomatic settlement of 
Afghanistan-Pakistan differences.
• The United States should intensify discussions of the end-game in Afghanistan with the 
Russian government, including military-to-military talks.
• The United States and Russia should rapidly complete the U.S.-Russian agreement on 
Russia’s WTO accession.
• The United States should work with the European Union to press Russia to negotiate 
seriously with Georgia to complete a Georgia-Russia WTO agreement, while encouraging 
Georgia to limit talks to issues that are within the scope of the WTO’s work.
• The United States Congress should graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s 
restrictions and develop new legislation on Russian corruption and human rights.
• In reviewing the Magnitsky bill, the U.S. Congress should focus on discouraging large-
scale corrupt practices and major human rights violations in Russia by identifying those 
responsible and applying appropriate penalties, while ensuring due process to the accused, 
providing good safeguards, and allowing sufficient flexibility for the executive branch.
• The United States should revive efforts to sign the bilateral investment treaty negotiated 
in the mid-1990s, in order to address some of the primary concerns U.S. investors face in 
Russia and to provide them with recourse in the event of nationalization of U.S. companies’ 
investments in Russia, or other actions that are tantamount to nationalization.
• When Russia violates international commitments or its own laws through its domestic 
practices, the United States should express U.S. concerns while avoiding a patronizing tone.  
U.S. leaders should also avoid appearing to endorse Russian domestic practices that conflict 
with basic American values and Russia’s international obligations.
• The United States should accept that democratic political change within Russia will likely 
occur gradually and need not necessarily lead to American-style democracy.
• The United States should support Russian-led efforts at democratic and market reform 
when they occur, but should avoid steps likely to be viewed as interference in Russia’s 
domestic politics, which are often counterproductive.
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• In view of the vital American interests at stake in the U.S.-Russian relations, and 
Washington’s limited leverage over Russia’s slow domestic transition, the United States 
should not allow democracy promotion to dominate its approach to Russia.
The Consequences of Failure
Just as the United States should expect Russia to adjust many of its policies to achieve a sustainable 
cooperative relationship, Washington should recognize that Moscow is unlikely to support U.S. 
policy goals if the U.S.-Russian relationship significantly deteriorates.  As a result, the failure to 
establish an ongoing working relationship with Russia would be quite costly for the United States.
As a practical matter, even a stalled relationship could be problematic.  The United States and Russia 
are both motivated to improve relations largely on the basis of hopes for what a stronger relationship 
could produce.  If the prospects for realizing those hopes become too remote, it is uncertain whether 
what has been accomplished so far is sufficient to prevent our substantial remaining differences 
from tearing the U.S.-Russian relationship apart.
U.S. officials must carefully weigh not only the American national interests in working more closely 
with Russia, but also the costs and benefits of failing to do so, keeping in mind Moscow’s capacity 
to act as a spoiler in a number of areas and on a number of issues that are of vital national interest 
to Washington.  In our considered judgment, the choice is clear: the United States should pursue a 
sustainable cooperative relationship with Russia to advance vital American national interests, but 
do so without illusions regarding either Moscow’s sometimes neo-imperial ambitions, or the pace of 
democratic change in Russia. 
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Russia and U.S. National Interests
Introduction
Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s emergence as an independent state, 
Moscow is no longer America’s strategic rival.  Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it 
become a friend.  Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, 
but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations.  A better-managed bilateral relationship is 
critical for the advancement of America’s vital national interests. 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia’s President next year 
does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia’s national 
interests with respect to the United States.  Still, at a minimum, Russia’s rhetoric vis-à-vis America 
and the West may become tougher under Putin.  Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper 
focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. 
policymakers.
This report, the result of deliberations by a distinguished working group of former senior officials 
and military officers, business leaders, and top experts, analyzes the U.S.-Russia relationship through 
the lens of American national interests; argues that Russia is a pivotal country in promoting these 
U.S. national interests; and offers prescriptions for U.S. policy toward Russia in the period ahead.  
America’s Vital National Interests
Although politicians and pundits routinely invoke the concept of vital national interests to justify 
virtually any desired course of action, we hold to a narrow view of U.S. vital interests.  Specifically, 
vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance 
Americans’ survival and well-being in a free and secure nation.  
From this perspective, we can identify five American vital national interests:
• Preventing the use and slowing the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction, securing nuclear weapons and materials, and preventing proliferation of 
intermediate and long-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons;
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• Maintaining a balance of power in Europe and Asia that promotes peace and stability with 
a continuing U.S. leadership role;
• Preventing large-scale or sustained terrorist attacks on the American Homeland; 
• Ensuring energy security; and 
• Assuring the stability of the international economy.
Why Russia Matters to the United States
In view of Russia’s difficult history, sometimes troubling behavior, relatively small economy, and 
reduced international role since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
United States needs Moscow as a partner.  
We believe Russia must be a top priority for the United States because its conduct can have a 
profound impact on America’s vital national interests:
• Nuclear Weapons.  President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush each 
identified nuclear terrorism as the number one threat to American national security.  The 
United States and Russia together possess 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons and most 
of the world’s weapons-usable material, and both are major suppliers of civilian nuclear 
technologies around the world.  Also, Russia is the only nation that could destroy America 
as we know it in thirty minutes.  Russia’s meaningful assistance and support is critical to 
preventing nuclear war.  
• Non-Proliferation. Russia plays a key role in U.S.-led international efforts to inhibit 
the spread of nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials and technologies, which are 
sought not only by nation states, but also by non-state actors.  Moscow has generally 
supported American initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism and shared intelligence 
on al Qaeda with Washington.  Without Russia’s assistance, the United States will face 
considerable additional difficulties in seeking to slow down nuclear proliferation and 
prevent nuclear terrorism.
• Geopolitics.  Russia is an important nation in today’s international system.  Aligning 
Moscow more closely with American goals would bring significant balance of power 
advantages to the United States—including in managing China’s emergence as a global 
power.  Ignoring Russian perspectives can have substantial costs.  Russia’s vote in the 
United Nations Security Council and its influence elsewhere is consequential to the success 
of U.S. international diplomacy on a host of issues.
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• Afghanistan.  Al Qaeda operatives have engaged in terrorist attacks against the United 
States and have encouraged and supported attacks by domestic terrorist groups in Russia.  
Russia has provided the United States with access to its airspace and territory as a critical 
alternative supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, something that has grown in 
importance as America’s relations with Pakistan have deteriorated.  Moscow has also shared 
intelligence on Afghanistan and al Qaeda, helps to train Afghan law enforcement officers, 
and supplies hardware to them and to the Afghan National Army.
• Energy.  Russia is one of the world’s leading energy producers and is the top holder of 
natural gas reserves .Russia thus has a substantial role in maintaining and expanding 
energy supplies that keep the global economy stable and enable economic growth in the 
United States and around the world.
• Finance.  Russia’s membership in the G8 and the G20 gives it a seat at the table for the most 
important financial and economic meetings and deliberations.
• Strategic Geography.  Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area and the largest in 
Europe by population.  It is located at a strategic crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the 
greater Middle East and is America’s neighbor in the Arctic.  As a result, Russia is close to 
trouble-spots and a critical transit corridor for energy and other goods.
Reviewing these areas makes clear that Russia’s choices and actions impact the full range of vital U.S. 
national interests significantly and directly.  Few other nations are as important to the United States.  
Can and Should the United States Seek to Work with Russia?
Some acknowledge that Russia matters to the United States, but argue that the Russian government’s 
foreign and domestic conduct prevents the U.S. from cooperating effectively with Moscow.  Having 
worked with Russia over the past two decades, members of this group are painfully aware of 
how difficult Russian policy and action can sometimes be.  Nevertheless, we believe strongly that 
America can engage effectively with Moscow in ways that advance U.S. national interests and values. 
Where best efforts by the United States are rebuffed, Washington should act to achieve what it can 
and continue to engage toward further progress.
Those who dismiss efforts to collaborate with Moscow typically argue that the U.S. cannot 
collaborate with Russia because:
• American and Russian national interests diverge so substantially that cooperation is 
impractical and unlikely to achieve substantial results.
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• American and Russian values differ so significantly that cooperation is impossible without 
sacrificing key U.S. principles.
• The possible benefits to the United States will not justify the effort, either because Russia 
is too difficult or unreliable an interlocutor or, alternatively, because Moscow is not able to 
deliver on important issues.
This section briefly responds to each of these objections.
First, U.S. and Russian national interests do indeed diverge in many areas.  Despite this, however, the 
United States and Russia share many common interests, including some which are vital: slowing the 
spread of nuclear weapons; combatting international terrorism; promoting a reliable international 
energy system; and sustaining a prosperous world economy.
Of course, American and Russian national interests, priorities, and perspectives will likely always 
differ in significant respects.  Thus U.S. leaders must recall clearly that their obligation is to advance 
American national interests rather than U.S.-Russian relations.  Sustainable cooperative relations 
with Moscow are an instrument to achieve key U.S. goals, not an end in themselves, and Washington 
must be prepared to confront Russia when U.S. national interests require it.
Second, the fact that the United States and Russia have different political systems, and that many 
Americans see considerable flaws in how Russia is ruled, should not prevent cooperation with 
Moscow to advance American national interests.  The first responsibility of the U.S. government is 
to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people.  Because many nations important to 
the United States are governed differently, the U.S. government continues to have no alternative but 
to work with undemocratic governments when important national interests are at stake.   In this 
context, there is no real substitute for dealing with Russia, in particular on countering proliferation, 
combating international terrorism and enhancing energy security.
Finally, concerns about Russia’s present unreliability or long-term prospects are not entirely 
misplaced. Russia is not an easy partner.  Moreover, while Russia has considerable strengths, 
including its nuclear arsenal, vast energy reserves, still-considerable military power in Eurasia, and 
a highly developed scientific establishment, it also faces enormous challenges, including shrinking 
population, low life expectancy, dilapidated infrastructure, and massive corruption.  The charts on 
the following pages illustrate these enduring contradictions.
Category Russia from the perspective of U.S. interests
USA from the perspective of 
Russian interests
Deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons
No. 2   (1,537) No. 1   (1,800)
Oil production No. 1   (9,934 thousand barrels 
per day)
No. 3   (9,141 thousand barrels 
per day)
Natural gas production No. 2   (21,545 billion cubic feet) No. 1   (21,577 billion cubic feet)
GDP (dollar exchange rate) No. 11   ($1,479,819 million) No. 1   ($14,582,400 million) 
GDP (PPP) No. 6   ($2,812,383 million) No. 1   ($14,582,400 million)
Global exports No. 10   ($ 400,100 million) No. 3   ($1,289,000 million) 
Global imports No. 18   ($ 248,700 million) No. 1   ($1,936,000 million)
Bilateral trade No. 24 on the list of U.S.’ trading 
partners
No. 11 on the list of Russia’s 
trading partners
Population No. 9   (141.7 million) No. 3   (309.7 million)
Total area No. 1   (17,098,242 sq. km.) No. 3.   (9,826,675 sq. km.)
Life expectancy No. 161   (66 years) No. 50   (78 years)
Sources: U.S. Department of State, 2011; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2009; Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2010; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2011; Federal Customs Service of 
Russia, 2011; World Bank 2010.
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Natural Gas Exports, 2009
Russia    20.28%
Norway    11.20%
Canada    10.62%
Qatar    7.72%Netherlands    6.30%
Algeria    5.96%
Indonesia    4.04%
Malaysia    3.49%
USA    3.44%
Australia   2.29%
Others    24.66%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Crude Oil Exports, 2009 Saudi Arabia    12.02%
Russia    10.27%
Iran    4.24%
Nigeria    3.96%
UAE    3.70%
Iraq    3.55%
Angola    3.44%
Norway    3.35%
Canada    2.82%
Others    50.00%
Kuwait    2.55%
USA    0.08%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Russian Demographic Data, 1990–2009
Source: Central Intelligence Agency.
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Freedom House Rankings, Russia 2010
Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index  2010, Russia
Civil Liberties score: 5
Political Rights score:  6
Status: Not Free
Levels of political rights and civil liberties are scored on a scale from 1 (most 
free) to 7 (least free). Depending on the ratings, the nations are then classified 
as “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free”.
Levels of freedom and editorial independence enjoyed by the press are scored 
on a scale from 1 (most free) to 100 (least free).
Score: 81
Rank: 175
Status: Not Free
The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries on a scale from 10 
(highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
Score: 2.1
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Americans often tend to focus on either Russia’s strengths or its weaknesses without seeking an 
integrated understanding of the real Russia.  This is problematic, because it leads to dangerous 
assumptions about Russia’s motives and conduct.  For example, those who focus on Moscow’s 
strengths frequently see an assertive and dangerous rival without recognizing Russia’s profound 
insecurity.  Conversely, those who concentrate on Russia’s shortcomings see a defeated power 
ill-prepared to resist American pressure or preferences.  While these descriptions are clearly 
caricatures, views like those described above can produce damaging misjudgments.  
Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the 
dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other.  The Russian government’s 
failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign 
policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and 
contributes to a sense of insecurity.  Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage 
its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests.
The stakes are high.  Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even 
devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, 
or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities.  This is true even though most in 
Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global 
leadership without the support of other major powers.
Russia’s National Interests
Developing U.S. policy toward Russia requires an understanding of Russia’s objectives and its likely 
reactions to particular American actions.  This in turn necessitates an assessment of Russia’s national 
interests as they are defined by Russian leaders in Moscow.  Unfortunately, it is not always easy to 
identify Russia’s interests clearly, due to differing perspectives within the Russian elite, Moscow’s 
less-than-transparent political process, and the Russian government’s tendency to focus on 
immediate tactical issues at the expense of strategic thinking.  
Vladimir Putin’s almost assured return to Russia’s presidency next year is likely to end the duality in 
Russia’s leadership and, as a result, to make Russia’s foreign policy more coherent and predictable.  
Though Mr. Putin has clearly supported the basic outlines of President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
diplomacy, his unapologetically tough and skeptical style could affect how Moscow’s positions are 
presented as well as his government’s flexibility in talks with the United States.
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The Russian leadership appears to consider the following to be among Russia’s principal national interests:
• Preventing the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and 
preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the post-Soviet space;  
• Maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability as a guarantor of Russia’s sovereignty and 
great power status;
• Preventing major terrorist attacks in Russia;
• Sustaining Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and denying competing powers or 
alliances the ability to dominate the post-Soviet space;
• Assuring continued revenue flows from Russia’s energy exports and ensuring that other 
states are not able to exercise leverage over Russia’s energy exports;
• Protecting the security and stability of Russia’s current political system, something made 
more difficult because it does not derive its legitimacy from either tradition or democratic 
procedures; and,
• Protecting and advancing the economic interests of major political-business alliances 
within Russia’s elite.
U.S. and Russian interests clearly overlap in several areas, including their shared desire to avoid 
nuclear war, prevent proliferation, and limit terrorism.  However, U.S. and Russian interests also 
differ in important ways, particularly with respect to the post-Soviet space and in the commitment 
of Russia’s leaders to maintaining their country’s current system of government and to protecting the 
economic interests of groups in Russian elite.  
More generally, Russia’s determination to be treated like a great power can contribute to tension 
with the United States.  For example, Russian leaders appear to see their desire to maintain an 
unquestioned nuclear deterrent capability as being at odds with Washington’s and NATO’s missile 
defense plans.  Similarly, Russia’s need for a strong voice in influencing UN Security Council 
decisions often conflicts with America’s efforts to win Security Council support in advancing its 
foreign policy objectives and values.  
The United States and Russia can overcome the gap between their national interests in the name 
of cooperation to advance more important or vital interests, but their differences are serious 
and real.  And many of these differences are likely to endure as long as Russia’s current political 
arrangements remain in place and possibly beyond.  Therefore, even a purposeful U.S. policy is 
in itself insufficient to ensure sustainable cooperation in the absence of Russian efforts to make 
a cooperative relationship succeed.  The United States can and should work to encourage those 
efforts, but cannot guarantee them.
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Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Russia
The Obama Administration’s reset policy has contributed to significant improvements in the U.S.-
Russian relationship. Unfortunately, the reset is still fragile and what remains to be done is likely to 
be much more difficult than what has been accomplished so far.  Twice before, under the Clinton 
and George W. Bush Administrations, U.S.-Russian relations moved in the direction of a new and 
different relationship—yet both times, the efforts stalled. 
In some respects, difficulty sustaining improvements in the U.S.-Russia relationship has had less to do 
with specific differences and more to do with an inability to break down lasting mutual distrust. This 
suspicion of one another’s motives may in fact be a greater obstacle to cooperation than sometimes 
divergent national interests and values.  Some of the most challenging problems, like missile defense, 
are quite hard to manage without mutual confidence, but failure to manage them only creates further 
doubt in the minds of leaders in both capitals.  Addressing these difficult issues requires a process of 
dialogue that works simultaneously toward building more trust and toward developing practical policy 
solutions.  Shared success in tackling hard problems can create its own momentum.
Domestic politics in each country makes this even more challenging.  When U.S. and Russian 
leaders seek to portray their improving relations as important diplomatic successes, their political 
opponents naturally take a contrary view.  Politics can play a considerable role in shaping U.S.-
Russian relations, something that became apparent during the 2010 debate over the New START 
Treaty in the United States.
More generally, even in the absence of partisan political differences, U.S. leaders have often fueled 
unrealistic expectations about the U.S.-Russian relationship and developments in Russia.  This leads 
inevitably to disillusionment and frustration that weaken any administration’s ability to conduct a 
sustainable policy in service of U.S. national interests.
Because U.S. and Russian interests and values are not aligned, and perspectives and strategies are often 
even farther apart, Washington and Moscow at best will make progress in some areas and see setbacks 
in others—a reality that would make mutual trust even more important for managing differences.
Finally, given the disparities between U.S. and Russian interests and governance, lasting cooperation 
is unlikely if not impossible without determined leadership from far-sighted leaders in the executive 
and legislative branches, particularly the President.  To take the difficult steps necessary to build a 
foundation for a sustainable U.S.-Russian relationship, the White House must not only discipline 
the executive branch and focus its efforts, but also spend political capital in the U.S. Congress.  
Preoccupation with domestic priorities in a highly polarized domestic political environment cannot 
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but limit the administration’s ability to build a bipartisan consensus on a controversial topic like 
American policy toward Russia.
The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Proliferation
The overriding priority of U.S. national security policy must be to prevent the use and spread of 
nuclear weapons.  This task is extremely difficult without Russia’s cooperation.
The fact that the United States and Russia continue jointly to possess the vast majority of the world’s 
nuclear weapons, and a capability to annihilate one another—or any other nation—many times 
over, puts nuclear issues at the top of the bilateral agenda.  Unlike the Cold War era, however, today 
a U.S.-Russian nuclear war seems almost inconceivable.  The United States faces much greater risks 
from hostile states with small nuclear arsenals and from terrorist groups seeking nuclear weapons.
In the security environment of the early twenty-first century, America has four specific vital national 
interests related to countering nuclear proliferation that Russia can help to advance:
• Securing all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable material to a gold standard-
beyond the reach of terrorists and thieves;
• Limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials and technologies globally;
• Maintaining and strengthening strict Russian government controls over nuclear weapons, 
weapons-usable materials, and technologies inside Russia; preventing them from falling 
into the hands of those who could threaten the United States; and avoiding accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; and,
• Pursuing further U.S.-Russian nuclear force reductions and working with Russia to involve 
other nuclear weapons states in talks on reductions.
The future of the global nuclear order will be determined to a large extent by whether Washington 
and Moscow agree on the diagnosis of the threat and jointly develop and apply a remedy.  As the 
world’s leading nuclear weapons states, the United States and Russia have a unique ability, and a 
unique responsibility, to cooperate to manage the threat of nuclear proliferation.  
The United States and Russia are already playing lead roles in building and maintaining an 
international counter-proliferation regime.  Washington and Moscow have decades of experience 
crafting requirements and perfecting methods of ensuring nuclear security, including the securing 
of stockpiles and disposing of decommissioned weapons and materials, that can be used as a 
model by other countries.  Moscow has already helped importantly in denuclearizing Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus.
20 Russia and U.S. National Interests    Why Should Americans Care?
Russia’s capabilities as an exporter of nuclear power plants and related equipment and technologies 
and as a processor of nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are also central to global non-proliferation.  
Finally, further consolidation of stockpiles remains necessary in Russia, which still has the world’s 
largest number of facilities containing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials.  
Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are and should be of special concern to the United States 
in view of the potential missile threat to U.S. forces and U.S allies in the Middle East and Europe, 
as well as the dangers of further proliferation in the Middle East or nuclear terrorism.  Russia’s 
geographic location, regional influence, role as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, and relationship with Iran make it an important potential partner in 
managing these problems.  However, while Russia shares many U.S. concerns about Iran, Russia’s 
perceptions, priorities and strategies are not fully in alignment with America’s.
In the United States, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is one of our highest foreign 
policy priorities, because some believe that Iran might use nuclear weapons against a U.S. target 
in the region or against a U.S. ally and that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons would change the 
regional balance of power, emboldening Tehran, deterring Washington, and intimidating U.S. allies 
and friends.  Many Americans are also concerned that if Iran should develop nuclear weapons, other 
states in the region might also seek them.
In Russia, the emergence of a nuclear Iran is seen as a serious threat to Russia’s vital interests, but 
many are skeptical that Tehran’s drive for nuclear weapons can be stopped.  Russians recognize that 
Iran can affect other vital Russian interests, including extremist Islamist terrorism in Russia’s North 
Caucasus region, stability in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and energy interests 
in the Caspian.  Like China, Russia sees the benefits of trade in technology and arms as more 
immediate than an Iranian nuclear weapon, particularly given its judgment that the only strategies 
the United States is willing or able to implement are unlikely to change Iranian behavior.  Despite 
differences, the Russian government has been more supportive of American policy toward Iran 
than China, usually when the United States, in concert with European allies, has demonstrated the 
benefits of closer U.S.-Russian cooperation or when Iran’s actions have provoked Russian concern, 
as when Iran’s deliberate efforts to conceal enrichment facilities were exposed.  Senior Russian 
officials have explicitly stated that Russia could work more closely with the United States on Iran 
if America and Russia were genuine partners—in other words, if the benefits of the overall U.S.-
Russian relationship offset the possible damage to Russian interests resulting from deterioration in 
Moscow’s ties to Tehran. This suggests that the United States does have some influence over Russia’s 
hierarchy of priorities.
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While Washington should continue to explain its perspective as persuasively as possible, U.S.-
Russian differences of opinion over Iran seem unlikely to change substantially in the absence of 
new facts or changes in Iran’s behavior.  With this in mind, efforts to secure greater and more 
consistent Russian support for America’s approach to Iran are likely to succeed to the extent that 
they occur in the context of an improving U.S.-Russian relationship that addresses not only U.S. 
priorities but also Russia’s aims.  For example, Russian concerns about the impact of unilateral 
U.S. sanctions against Russian firms that are observing UN Security Council sanctions on Iran 
could become an obstacle to further Russian cooperation, particularly when the United States 
holds European companies to a different standard.  
In addition to Iran, North Korea is the world’s other major state-driven nuclear proliferation 
challenge.  Needless to say, North Korea differs fundamentally from Iran in that Pyongyang already 
possesses nuclear warheads.  Unfortunately, while Russia has limited influence over Iran, it seems 
to have even less influence over North Korea.  Both the United States and Russia appear in some 
respects to have ceded leadership in dealing with North Korea to China.  But fearing instability in 
North Korea, Beijing has been reluctant to apply pressure to the world’s last totalitarian communist 
state.  Still, Pyongyang’s economic troubles and particular interest in Russian energy may provide 
Moscow with some leverage.  Furthermore, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
participant in the six-party talks and North Korea’s neighbor, Russia can do more to encourage the 
DPRK to make a deal that would reduce the nuclear threat emanating from its fledgling arsenal in a 
transparent and verifiable way.
In assisting Russia to secure its own arsenal, the United States has advanced its national interests 
through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  While this assistance contributed 
substantially to American security at a reasonable cost—particularly in comparison to the potential 
impact of an attack employing stolen weapons or materials—concern over deficits in the United 
States, along with Russia’s economic recovery, has made it timely to move beyond an economic 
assistance philosophy to a jointly funded and managed cooperative undertaking that not only 
sustains current programs in Russia, but also addresses equivalent challenges in other countries.
Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should engage Russia to develop and implement a jointly produced 
and concrete roadmap with a firm timeline to attaining the highest possible standards 
of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) everywhere in the world. In doing so, the two nations should use their 
nuclear establishments’ experience, technologies, criteria, and best practices as a basis to 
operationalize United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
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• The United States should engage Russia to orchestrate international consensus that there 
will be no new national HEU enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, using strict criteria 
for restraining the sale of these technologies, ensuring the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
cooperates only with states that comply with international laws and regulations, and 
promoting nuclear fuel assurances and cradle-to-grave fuel cycle services.
• The United States and Russia should lead international efforts to control production and 
consolidation of fissile material, encouraging China, Pakistan, and India to announce 
a moratorium on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and pressing for a 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; phasing out use of HEU in civil commerce and removing 
weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world.
• The United States should intensify discussions with Russia on global nuclear energy, 
especially with respect to procedures and technologies to reduce proliferation risks, 
possibly including internationalization of the fuel cycle.
• The United States should continue to engage Russia in a conversation about alternative 
approaches to the Iran challenge, including possible joint support for a regional 
security system that could create incentives for Iran to abandon its nuclear program or, 
alternatively, demonstrate to Iran that pursuing nuclear weapons could undermine rather 
than improve its security.
• The United States should seek to enlist Russian cooperation in pressing China to work 
more assertively to persuade North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons, noting the 
potential positive impact on regional perceptions of Chinese conduct.
• The United States should forcefully advocate for Russian assistance vis-à-vis Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (see section on Central Asia), not least to ensure the security of Pakistan’s 
nuclear arsenal and to reduce the risk of further proliferation from Pakistan. 
• The United States should encourage Russia to enforce UN Security Council sanctions 
against Iran and North Korea and to avoid actions that provide material economic support 
to Tehran or Pyongyang.
• The United States should seek to limit the harmful impact of U.S. economic sanctions 
on Russian firms that are observing existing UN Security Council sanctions against Iran 
as part of wider efforts to secure Moscow’s cooperation in dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program.
• The United States should encourage Russia to continue to observe President Dmitry 
Medvedev’s decree banning the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran and to 
avoid sales of other potentially destabilizing arms or technologies to Iran or North Korea.
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• The United States should encourage Russia to observe strict safeguards consistent with 
or exceeding existing international agreements to which Moscow is a party in its sales of 
nuclear power equipment or technologies.
• The United States should secure the Russian government’s consent to extend the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, which expire in 2013, with a view to attaining 
Russian financing to sustain and internationalize the programs, allowing Moscow and 
Washington to share best practices with other countries.  The United States should also 
encourage Russia to further consolidate its nuclear stockpiles.
Arms Control and Missile Defense
The United States and Russia are no longer enemies. Despite this, both maintain strategic nuclear 
forces at levels that would, if ever used, assure destruction of both.  The probability of a Russian nuclear 
attack on the United States as a result of an accident or false warning has decreased compared to the 
years immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of such an accident require more effort to reduce the risk further.
America’s current inventory of strategic nuclear weapons is a legacy of the Cold War; as noted by the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the U.S. needs relatively few 
nuclear weapons to deter China or other nations and can reduce its arsenal if Russia is prepared to do 
the same.  Such reductions can also strengthen Washington’s negotiating position in seeking to tighten 
the global non-proliferation regime.  Nevertheless, while the United States and Russia have successfully 
concluded the New START treaty, further bilateral arms reduction agreements appear unlikely in the 
foreseeable future due to ongoing differences over tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense.  
Eliminating American and Russian tactical nuclear weapons could contribute usefully to nuclear 
security simply by reducing the number of warheads to secure.  However, in view of Moscow’s 
reliance on these weapons to compensate for the weakness of its conventional forces (particularly 
those in the Russian Far East) relative to China, a U.S.-Russian tactical nuclear arms reduction treaty 
appears improbable in the short-to-medium term. A U.S.-Russian agreement that bundles together 
deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons for reductions and provides for some transparency for 
tactical arsenals would be easier to attain.   
The United States has important interests in pursuing missile defense in Europe and elsewhere in 
order to improve the security of the United States, its deployed military forces, and its allies.  However, 
protecting against attack is not the sole purpose of missile defense.  Missile defense could not only 
deter a nuclear Iran from launching a missile attack, but also discourage Tehran from believing that the 
threat of such an attack could deter the United States or coerce its neighbors or others.
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Russia’s principal concerns about missile defense appear to relate to the purpose and eventual 
capabilities of planned and potential future systems.  Because many in the Russian government 
do not see an imminent missile threat to Europe—they insist that Iran is far from developing a 
nuclear device, and even farther from placing a usable nuclear warhead on a missile capable of 
reaching European targets—they suspect that the threat from Iran is America’s justification for 
building a missile defense system rather than its reason for doing so.  The fact that the global system 
Washington plans could cost hundreds of billions of dollars only increases Russian skepticism; why, 
they ask, would the United States spend so much for the capability to shoot down a dozen nuclear 
missiles that do not yet exist?  
Because of this, many in Russia’s military-political leadership appear seriously concerned that 
America’s open-ended missile defense architecture may eventually evolve to undermine the 
retaliatory capability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces through a future “surge” in interceptor 
production.  This concern about the system’s potential in one to two decades is driving Moscow’s 
desire for guarantees that existing or future U.S. missile defense systems will not target Russia.
Missile defense cooperation could be one way of addressing Russia’s concerns, though such 
collaboration is a politically sensitive topic in Washington.  President Obama has promised to the 
Senate that the United States will not accept any restrictions on its missile defense from Russia, 
and thirty-nine Republican Senators have written to the President expressing their opposition to 
sharing sensitive missile technology with Russia or granting Moscow a veto over the U.S. use of a 
missile defense system.
In Europe, missile defense generates different political challenges.  Though America’s NATO 
allies appear somewhat less interested than Washington in the concept of missile defense, some 
new NATO members in Central Europe seem to welcome an opportunity to host U.S. systems 
and personnel that, in their view, strengthen U.S. security guarantees.  As a result, once these 
arrangements have been made, some in these nations might interpret an agreement with Russia that 
eliminates or scales back the planned facilities as sacrificing their interests in favor of Moscow’s or, 
more starkly, as U.S. abandonment.
Given current plans for missile defense and uncertainty about its effectiveness, its significance 
appears at times to be overstated for varying political reasons in both the United States and Russia.  
Nevertheless, effective missile defenses on the scale currently envisioned could contribute valuably 
to the security of the United States and its allies without compromising Russia’s nuclear deterrent 
capabilities. The challenge for the United States lies in finding an approach that balances U.S. national 
interests, the concerns of U.S. allies in Central Europe, and Russia’s sensitivities.  This should be 
possible through some combination of data-sharing, transparency, and specific assurances to Moscow.  
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Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should explore with Russia a new strategic stability concept that reflects 
the fact that Washington and Moscow are no longer enemies prepared to destroy each 
other, but rather potential partners.
• The next round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction should combine deployed and non-
deployed weapons to lower the ceiling of strategic warheads to 1,000 or fewer.  The United 
States should also work with Russia to draw other nations into nuclear arms reduction talks. 
• In discussing tactical nuclear weapons with Russia, the United States should focus first on 
negotiating consolidation, transparency and verification measures rather than reductions.
• The United States should strive to negotiate reciprocal and verifiable measures with Russia 
to increase the warning and decision times for their nuclear missile forces.
• The United States should proceed with developing anti-missile systems in Europe and 
globally, in line with the realistic assessment of existing and future threats and available 
technologies and funds.
• The United States should lead NATO in completing a joint assessment of missile threats 
with Russia as a basis for a NATO-Russia agreement on missile defense cooperation. 
Building on the 1997 Founding Act on NATO-Russian relations, this agreement should 
declare that its signatories «have no intention, no plan and no reason» to deploy missile 
defense assets in Europe in such a way that they would target or intercept strategic 
delivery vehicles of each other. The agreement should, to the extent feasible, provide for 
continuous sharing of data; exchanges of liaison officers, and joint exercises in detecting 
and intercepting missiles.
• The United States should encourage transparency regarding Russian forces, actions, and 
plans that is equivalent to U.S. transparency towards Moscow.
• The United States should press Russia to refrain from potentially destabilizing changes in 
its strategic nuclear posture and plans.
The United States, Russia, and Geopolitics
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, Russia, and NATO have been unable to develop a 
mutually-acceptable European security system.  Many in America and Europe have taken the view 
that as the victors in the Cold War, Washington and its allies alone should define the structures of 
European security and that any role for Moscow is a concession to Russia.  This is a mistake, because 
it will not be possible to establish enduring security, peace, and prosperity on the whole in Europe 
on the basis of a security system that antagonizes Russia.  Russia is geographically within Europe 
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and its decisions can have a significant impact on Europe and European security whether or not 
Russia belongs to any particular institution or arrangement.
While President Medvedev’s proposed security treaty is not the solution, refusing to discuss a new 
security system effectively excludes Russia from European security and encourages Moscow to 
balance against the United States and NATO.  This does not advance U.S. national interests.  The 
existing system also leaves many disputes and frozen conflicts unresolved.  Both the United States 
and its European allies should welcome a new mechanism of conflict prevention, interdiction and 
resolution in Europe, including post-conflict stabilization, that would be less prone to deadlocks 
similar to those seen in the UN Security Council over Kosovo, and that could be employed 
in a timely manner to prevent conflicts similar to the August 2008 war in which Russia sided 
with Georgia’s separatist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Integrating Russia into the 
European security system in a mutually-acceptable manner, or even consulting more frequently and 
intensively with Moscow, could contribute valuably to security and stability in a strategically and 
economically critical region. 
A more effective security architecture in Europe could also help win Russian cooperation in other 
areas, including vis-à-vis China.  Moscow is very unlikely to take any chances with Beijing when it is 
simultaneously insecure to the West.  Yet, China’s rapid economic growth, along with its increasing 
regional and global political influence, seems likely to be a central challenge facing the United States 
and Russia in the coming decades.  America’s critical task in managing China’s rise is to shape the 
international environment in ways that will encourage Beijing to work within and adapt to the 
existing global order rather than seeking to redefine it substantially at America’s expense.  This 
in turn requires the United States to work closely with the world’s other major powers, including 
Russia.  Needless to say, pursuing such discussions with Moscow will not be easy; any effort to work 
with Russia to manage China’s rise will require patient and careful diplomacy, clear demonstration 
of the potential benefits to Russia, articulation of an approach that will not alienate Beijing, and a 
deeper sense of trust than currently exists.
Despite significant disagreements over policies and the proper role of the United Nations, 
Washington has been successful at times in winning Moscow’s support for U.S. goals in the 
UN Security Council—something that has generally facilitated China’s support as well.  This 
serves important U.S. national interests by enhancing the international legitimacy of American 
action.  It also enlists Moscow and Beijing in pursuing American objectives and seeks to avoid the 
establishment of an enduring anti-American voting bloc in the UN Security Council—something 
that would return the body to its Cold War era dysfunction.
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A more proactive U.S. approach to discussion of potential trouble spots with Russia could lay the 
groundwork for accelerated Security Council deliberations and improve prospects for U.S.-Russian 
agreements in the future, including in areas of disagreement.
Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should be prepared to launch a genuine and substantive dialogue first 
with its NATO allies and then with Russia about a new inclusive European security system 
that would give Russia a meaningful voice and that would include an effective rapid 
response mechanism of conflict prevention, interdiction and resolution.
• In making major international policy decisions, the United States should consider 
whether U.S. actions could consolidate Russian-Chinese cooperation at the expense of 
wider U.S. goals.
• As long as it appears feasible, achieving broader U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Russia should have 
priority over expanding NATO membership in ways that could undermine cooperation on 
greater U.S. priorities.
• The United States should discourage Russia and Georgia from any further confrontation 
and work toward a peaceful, long-term solution to the status of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, recognizing legitimate interests of all parties.
• The United States should agree with Russia and leading European states on what additional 
measures the Minsk Group should take to discourage resumption of hostilities between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh and work toward a peaceful, long-term 
resolution of this conflict as well as the Transdniestrian conflict, recognizing the legitimate 
interests of all parties.
• The United States should encourage Russia to refrain from destabilizing arms or technology 
sales to China.
• The United States should encourage Russia to pursue consultation and transparency 
regarding the activities of its conventional forces in Europe and Asia equivalent to U.S. efforts.
The United States, Russia, and Energy Security
As one of the world’s single most important energy producers, Russia plays a central role in 
international energy markets.  Russia’s investment and regulatory decisions will have a profound 
impact on global energy supplies in the years ahead, particularly in light of its aging energy 
infrastructure and limited investment in future production opportunities.  Thus, Moscow’s 
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economic choices could substantially affect the prices American consumers and companies will 
pay for energy on world markets in the future.  Aside from investment and economic decisions, 
Russian political decisions can distort markets, including through efforts to use energy exports for 
political leverage.
The United States has four national interests with respect to Russia and energy security:
• Expanding Russian energy production and exports, which will likely require improved 
investment conditions, adoption of new technologies and management techniques, and 
reduction of waste and inefficiency;
• Avoiding Russian use of energy as political leverage to restrict the independence of other 
nations and disrupt markets;
• Strengthening the overall security environment in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin; and 
• Ensuring fair treatment for American companies in Russia.
Although Russia’s energy sector is the most significant in its economy by far, its output remains 
constrained by poor infrastructure, old technology, and ineffective management practices.  Russia’s 
energy companies are unlikely to be able to address these problems on their own anytime soon, 
because they lack the funds, the technology, and the experience.  Notwithstanding some new 
agreements, investment conditions in Russia have not attracted foreign investment on the scale 
necessary to overhaul the energy sector.  In fact, Russia’s investment conditions are not sufficient 
even to attract large-scale Russian investment. 
Poor investment conditions in the energy sector reflect the wider weakness of the rule of law in 
Russia as well as the Russian government’s desire to retain considerable control over energy, which 
is seen as both a principal vehicle for Russia’s national greatness in the twenty-first century and a key 
instrument of internal political influence because of the wealth it generates.  Lingering mistrust of 
market mechanisms among some Russian officials necessitates deep state involvement in the energy 
sector in order to produce desired outcomes. Moscow has been similarly unwilling to cede control 
or influence over its energy policy to external actors.  This is apparent in Russia’s lack of interest in 
joining OPEC (despite the group’s weak enforcement of production quotas), on the one hand, and 
its determined and at times counterproductive efforts to prevent Ukraine or other transit countries 
from having leverage over Russian energy exports via pipelines, on the other.   
Simultaneously, with few other effective foreign policy tools, particularly in Europe, the Russian 
government has relied heavily on its energy policy as an “equalizer” in dealing with leading Western 
governments and as a form of pressure on smaller nations.  While this has limited direct impact on 
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the United States, it has undermined European energy security and is a cause of serious concern 
among many U.S. allies.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s scientific establishment has faced declining resources 
and prestige—and large-scale emigration of talented researchers—but nevertheless Russia continues 
to possess considerable potential for advanced research in energy extraction, energy efficiency, 
alternative energy, and other high-technology fields.  President Medvedev has emphasized 
encouraging innovation as a central policy goal, though it is unclear whether this initiative can 
succeed absent improvements in the rule of law and progress in deregulation.  Russia could become 
a valuable partner in reducing consumption of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions from the 
United States and Russia, both of which have very high per capita emissions rates.
Thus far, U.S.-Russian engagement on energy issues has been sporadic and largely technical with 
the exception of the nuclear sphere, where Moscow and Washington have been making such strides 
as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement.  It also suffers from a mismatch between American and Russian 
approaches to the role of government in the energy sector.  Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Russian 
energy relationship has not received priority proportionate to what is at stake for the United States.  
Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should raise the priority of the U.S.-Russian energy dialogue and focus 
on removing obstacles to bilateral investment, trade, and research. 
• The United States should press Russia to improve investment conditions in the energy 
sector and in Russia’s overall economy and make clear to Moscow that mistreating U.S. and 
Western companies damages Russia’s investment climate and international image, and is an 
obstacle to improving relations with the United States.
• The United States should continue to support eventual Russian membership in the 
Organization for Economic and Cooperation and Development and the International 
Energy Agency as a means to improve policy coordination and transparency.
• The United States should incorporate discussions of energy security into dialogue with 
Russia regarding key global energy regions, e.g. the Middle East.
• The United States should encourage Russia to resolve energy-related disputes through 
dialogue, arbitration, litigation, or other means typical in addressing commercial 
disagreements rather than through efforts at intimidation.
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The United States, Russia, and Counter-Terrorism
The United States and Russia have each endured major terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists and 
remain under threat of further terrorism.  Although specific groups target the two countries for 
particular reasons, there are links between extremist networks that attack each country.  Al Qaeda 
has displayed consistent interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, exploring opportunities for such 
acquisition in former Soviet Union and other parts of the world. Terrorist groups based in Russia’s 
North Caucasus that conduct attacks on Russia have established ties with and sought financing from 
al Qaeda affiliates. Al Qaeda operatives have engaged in terrorist attacks against the United States 
and have encouraged attacks on Russia.  In addition, Washington and Moscow share concerns about 
the potential impact of terrorism in other regions, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central 
Asia as America and NATO gradually draw down forces in Afghanistan.
Despite these common concerns, and a shared interest in combating terrorism, the United States 
and Russia have different priorities; unsurprisingly, each government is most focused on immediate 
threats to its people, its territory, and, in the U.S. case, its military forces deployed overseas.  
America and Russia likewise take different approaches to combating terrorism, including in how 
they define the sources of terrorism, how they seek to reduce it, and how they establish the balance 
between security and liberty within their societies.
These differences have limited U.S.-Russian cooperation in fighting terrorism.  The United States 
has been reluctant to provide Moscow assistance in combating terrorism in the North Caucasus, 
primarily due to concerns about Russia’s approach to instability in the region, especially its human 
rights practices.  At the same time, Russia has been deeply skeptical of U.S. military interventions and 
American claims that democracy promotion can reduce extremism and terrorism.  Each government 
likely believes that the other’s policies actually cause rather than prevent terror.  Because neither 
government trusts the other’s approach, each is reluctant to share highly sensitive intelligence.  
The underdevelopment of U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation harms U.S. national interests.  
In Afghanistan, for example, Russia still has some potentially important intelligence resources 
due to its long presence there and its ongoing engagement with the country’s non-Pashtun ethnic 
groups.  Though substantive cooperation may develop slowly, it is essential to accelerate efforts to 
secure Russian cooperation.
Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should strengthen joint capabilities with Russia to collect and analyze 
intelligence on terrorist threats, including nuclear, biological, and conventional catastrophic 
terrorism threats to the two nations and their allies. The United States and Russia should 
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also consider establishing joint counter-terrorism teams modeled on U.S. and Russian 
forces that have conducted counter-narcotics raids in Afghanistan.
• The United States should seek to harmonize U.S. and Russian government lists of terrorist 
organizations subject to sanctions. Begin by encouraging Russia to conduct a joint U.S.-
Russian global terrorism threat assessment with the U.S., focused on developing a list of the 
world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations and their targets. 
• The United States should pursue more extensive joint counter-terrorism exercises with Russia.
The United States, Russia, and Central Asia, including Afghanistan
Europe was the central region of competition among the world’s great powers during the 
twentieth century.  While competition in Europe has declined, the contest for influence in 
Central Asia has intensified.  Outside powers seek access to Central Asia’s energy—and unlike 
past iterations of the scramble for resources, China is a key player.  At the same time, the 
United States and those in neighboring territories share concerns about instability, terrorism, 
and drug trafficking.
Fortunately, U.S.-Russian rivalry in Central Asia appears to have receded somewhat in the last 
few years, as Moscow’s anxiety over what it saw as U.S.-sponsored “color revolutions” in the 
former Soviet Union has subsided.  The United States and Russia cooperated during instability 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, largely avoiding the bilateral tension that previous instability there and 
elsewhere had produced.  Some in Moscow also appear increasingly to appreciate the value of the 
U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
As the United States and NATO draw down their military forces in Afghanistan, regional 
states including Russia will only grow in importance to Afghanistan’s stability.  Transit routes 
through Russia have become a key component  the American logistics line of communication to 
Afghanistan and may be even more crucial during the American and NATO withdrawal, in view 
of intensified military logistics requirements and ongoing worries about routes through Pakistan.  
This will require close and sustained engagement between Washington and Moscow.  If the U.S.-
Russian relationship deteriorates, Russia may limit its cooperation on Afghanistan, which could 
harm U.S. national interests.
Policy Prescriptions
• The United States should expand U.S. briefings of Russian civilian and military officials 
regarding U.S. plans in Afghanistan as part of a broader effort to build further cooperation 
there, including greater use of supply routes through Russia.
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• The United States should engage Russia on pressing Pakistan to end sanctuaries and 
support for groups fighting in Afghanistan and for promoting a diplomatic settlement of 
Afghanistan-Pakistan differences.
• The United States should intensify discussions of the end-game in Afghanistan with the 
Russian government, including military-to-military talks.
• The United States should propose a strategic dialogue on “rules of the road” to avoid zero-
sum approaches to Central Asia.  As a part of this, the United States should encourage 
Russia to respect the sovereignty of Central Asian states and to pursue its interests 
transparently and without the threat or use of force.
• The United States should explore opportunities for military cooperation with Russia based 
on the unique circumstances that have led each to have military bases in Kyrgyzstan.
• The United States should work to increase Russia’s participation in counter-narcotics 
operations in Afghanistan, in part to give Russia a greater stake in U.S. success in 
Afghanistan.
• The United States should seek to consult with Russia on infrastructure and other investments 
in Central Asia, particularly those connecting Afghanistan with the rest of the region.
The United States, Russia, and Trade and Investment
Russia ranks 24th among U.S. trading partners and 25th on the list of direct investments in America. 
The United States is Russia’s 11th largest trading partner and 10th largest source of foreign direct 
investment into Russia. In contrast, Germany is Russia’s third largest trading partner and fifth largest 
source of foreign investment.
There are many reasons for the slow development of U.S.-Russian economic relations, including 
most notably Russia’s business environment, which is poor in many respects due to weak rule of law 
and widespread corruption.
Bilateral U.S.-Russian trade and investment remains politically charged to a degree no longer seen 
in Russian trade with Europe, where economic interaction with Russian companies—state-owned or 
independent—appears more routine.  The continuing application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
to Russia in the United States is perhaps the key example. Congressional reluctance to graduate 
Russia from Jackson-Vanik, a strictly symbolic Cold War relic that imposes no substantively 
meaningful restrictions, suggests a wider U.S. resistance to deeper economic engagement to many in 
Russia.  This deters both American and Russian firms from working with one another.
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Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization and finally granting Russia Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (thereby removing Moscow from the Jackson-Vanik process) could provide an important 
boost to bilateral trade and investment by clearing away some of today’s psychological obstacles.  
Moreover, expanding trade and investment can create their own self-reinforcing dynamics as firms in 
each country become more comfortable in the economic relationship, and as the political constituency 
for economic engagement in each country grows and acquires critical mass.  
Of course, Russia’s WTO membership will require Moscow to conclude an agreement with Georgia, 
the sole outstanding WTO member after the United States without an accession agreement with 
Russia.  Georgia has attempted to use its WTO negotiations with Russia to address wider issues in 
Georgian-Russian relations, including the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  We consider this 
approach more likely to exacerbate existing tensions than to facilitate the return of those two regions 
to Georgia’s control.  
While Russia’s WTO membership would serve U.S. national interests, it would not adequately 
address shortcomings in Russian domestic practices or the interests of American companies trying 
to work in Russia’s corrupt business environment. Russia’s current inconsistent and sometimes harsh 
treatment of foreign investors undermines sustainable U.S.-Russian economic partnership.  
Despite this, bills on Russian corruption and human rights before the U.S. Congress are dangerously 
broad.  The version of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act under discussion when 
we prepared this report is intended to impose visa bans and asset freezes on officials associated with 
the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer jailed after accusing Russian officials of massive corruption.  
However, it could do significant damage to the U.S.-Russian relationship by allowing individual 
members of Congress to initiate proceedings against Russian officials or others whom they accuse 
of involvement in Magnitsky’s death or other significant human rights violations. But a narrower 
law with better safeguards could be an acceptable replacement for Jackson-Vanik and, together with 
the Obama Administration’s recent decision to block visas for some Russian officials involved in the 
detention and death of Magnitsky, would send a clear message that corruption affecting U.S. and 
Western companies and their employees, both foreign and Russian nationals, has consequences. 
The effort to deter corruption and reinforce the rule of law in Russia is ultimately important not only 
to U.S. national interests and values, but also to Russia’s future.  In addition to its contribution to 
human rights in Russia, the rule of law is essential to Russian efforts to build a diversified economy 
that creates a foundation for sustained economic growth.  This in turn is likely to expand Russia’s 
middle class and, over time, strengthen the forces in Russian society pressing for political and 
economic reform.
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Policy Prescriptions
• The United States and Russia should rapidly complete the U.S.-Russian agreement on 
Russia’s WTO accession.
• The United States should intensify bilateral consultations to address remaining obstacles 
to U.S.-Russian trade and investment, particularly to promote the rule of law and reduce 
corruption in Russia.
• The United States should work with the European Union to press Russia to negotiate 
seriously with Georgia to complete a Georgia-Russia WTO agreement, while encouraging 
Georgia to limit talks to issues that are within the scope of the WTO’s work.
• The United States Congress should graduate Russia from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s 
restrictions and develop new legislation on Russian corruption and human rights. 
• In reviewing the Magnitsky bill, the U.S. Congress should focus on discouraging large-
scale corrupt practices and major human rights violations in Russia by identifying those 
responsible and applying appropriate penalties, while ensuring due process to the accused, 
providing good safeguards, and allowing sufficient flexibility for the executive branch.
• The United States should revive efforts to sign the bilateral investment treaty negotiated 
in the mid-1990s, in order to address some of the primary concerns U.S. investors face in 
Russia and to provide them with recourse in the event of nationalization of U.S. companies’ 
investments in Russia, or other actions that are tantamount to nationalization.
• The United States should endorse the Russian government’s stated objective of privatizing 
large state-owned firms, including energy companies.
• The United States should pursue further liberalization of the bilateral visa regime with 
Russia to foster tourism, education and commerce.
• As the United States conducts its major review of export controls, it should consider 
controls in trade with Russia in a manner designed to facilitate exchanges of technology 
and direct investments in both countries.
• The United States should work with the European Union to press Russia to protect the 
rights of foreign firms doing business in Russia and should separately press Russia to 
protect the rights of American companies operating there.
The United States, Russia, and Democratic Values
Russia’s political system incorporates some elements of democracy, but is certainly not democratic.  
Perhaps the greatest weakness in Russia’s governance is lack of the rule of law, which undermines 
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the accountability of the country’s leadership to its people. Elections are deeply flawed and weak 
legislative and judicial branches fail to place checks on executive power.  (As noted above, the 
underdevelopment of the rule of law also impedes Russia’s economic development.)  Russia’s current 
system is sustained in part by a population that remains leery of change after past disappointments.  
Russia’s governance is and should be a serious concern to the United States and constrains the 
development of the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
Despite this, it is important to place Russia’s governance in historical perspective.  Unlike many 
former Soviet bloc countries in Central Europe, pre-1991 Russia had very limited experience with 
democracy.  And while Russia’s leaders bear responsibility for their decisions, post-1991 Russia did 
not always receive the best advice from the United States in implementing political and economic 
reforms.  Today, Russia lacks the rule of law, checks and balances and meaningful political freedom; 
nevertheless, Russian citizens enjoy historically unprecedented personal freedom and better 
economic prospects than any time since Russia’s independence.
Some trends in Russia today reflect in part social reactions to the country’s experience in the 
1990s, a time of unrealistic expectations in both countries about Russia’s future.  Americans should 
recognize that building modern democratic institutions is a generational task in Russia and other 
countries in transition.  Indeed, enforced democratic freedoms without strong institutions and a 
tradition of compromise and tolerance could bring anti-American nationalists to power, which is 
not in the U.S. national interest.  Lasting change will be driven by the gradually increasing demands 
of Russia’s expanding middle class rather than by foreign pronouncements. 
Vladimir Putin’s carefully-orchestrated emergence as the United Russia Party’s candidate—arranged 
in deep secrecy and avoiding public discussion even at the United Russia Party Congress—further 
vivifies that Russia is nowhere near a Western-style democracy.  And during his previous term as 
President, Mr. Putin showed no interest in external guidance on Russia’s domestic arrangements.
Unfortunately, while strengthening the rule of law, democracy, and adherence to international 
human rights standards in Russia serves American national interests and values, the United 
States has limited tools at its disposal to facilitate this in the absence of active broad-based policy 
engagement with the Russian government.  American political and rhetorical pressure can at times 
contribute to marginal changes in the Russian government’s domestic practices; however, its impact 
is generally peripheral and limited to isolated and lower-profile cases.  Real democratization will not 
occur in Russia in the absence of powerful internal forces calling for it.  Those forces are still weak 
at this time.  Unfortunately, visible U.S. support for specific individuals and groups can often be 
counterproductive and may put advocates of political reform within Russia at risk.
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In the decade following Russia’s independence, American expectations for Russian democracy were 
overly optimistic.  Still, broadly speaking, the Western approach to Russia since that time has been 
correct: the United States and the West have sought to promote economic development in Russia 
to expand and empower the middle class, based on a belief that rising expectations among a large 
middle class will be a key driver of democratization.  With this in mind, Russian membership in the 
World Trade Organization should be a high priority, given the WTO’s rule-setting functions and the 
potential economic benefits for the United States, Russia, and other countries in bringing the largest 
remaining economy outside the WTO into its framework.  However, if Russia does not pursue 
economic reform, and especially if energy prices fall, Russia could experience political instability.  
Serious instability would be particularly worrisome, as it could be detrimental to vital U.S. national 
interests, possibly even including the security of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
Recognizing the realities of Russian politics and society, Russia’s governance generally does not 
determine its foreign policy conduct, though Russia at times seems more comfortable interacting 
with authoritarian leaders—particularly on its periphery.  This is a fundamental difference from 
the past, when the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was animated by Soviet communist ideology 
and efforts to spread Soviet-style government around the globe.  Today, Moscow is essentially 
pragmatic, seeks to cooperate with democracies and non-democracies alike, and has abandoned 
Soviet-era messianic aims.  Recently, Russia collaborated with the United States in Kyrgyzstan’s 
transition after its 2010 revolution.
However, Russian officials have clearly stated their deep reservations about American efforts to 
promote democracy.  Russian leaders make clear that their opposition to U.S. democracy promotion 
is not opposition to American democracy or to democracy per se but instead reflects (1) suspicion 
of American motives (particularly in the former Soviet Union, where U.S. democracy promotion has 
been viewed as a façade for efforts to undermine Russia’s role), (2) anxiety about American methods 
and the destabilizing impacts of political change, and (3) general discomfort with the idea that one 
country should involve itself in another’s internal affairs.
Policy Prescriptions
• When Russia violates international commitments or its own laws through its domestic 
practices, the United States should express U.S. concerns while avoiding a patronizing tone.  
U.S. leaders should also avoid appearing to endorse Russian domestic practices that conflict 
with basic American values and Russia’s international obligations.
• The United States should accept that democratic political change within Russia will likely 
occur gradually and need not necessarily lead to American-style democracy.
• The United States should support Russian-led efforts at democratic and market reform 
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when they occur, but should avoid steps likely to be viewed as interference in Russia’s 
domestic politics, which are often counterproductive.
• The United States should continue official dialogue with Russia on human rights issues.
• The United States should make very clear in private discussions with Russian officials that 
Russian violations of international human rights norms can harm Russian national interests.
• In view of the vital American interests at stake in the U.S.-Russian relations, and 
Washington’s limited leverage over Russia’s slow domestic transition, the United States 
should not allow democracy promotion to dominate its approach to Russia.
The Consequences of Failure
Just as the United States should expect Russia to adjust many of its policies to achieve a sustainable 
cooperative relationship, Washington should recognize that Moscow is unlikely to support U.S. 
policy goals if the U.S.-Russian relationship significantly deteriorates.  As a result, the failure to 
establish an ongoing working relationship with Russia would be quite costly for the United States.
As a practical matter, even a stalled relationship could be problematic.  The United States and Russia 
are both motivated to improve relations largely on the basis of hopes for what a stronger relationship 
could produce.  If the prospects for realizing those hopes become too remote, it is uncertain whether 
what has been accomplished so far is sufficient to prevent our substantial remaining differences 
from tearing the U.S.-Russian relationship apart.
U.S. officials must carefully weigh not only the American national interests in working more closely 
with Russia, but also the costs and benefits of failing to do so, keeping in mind Moscow’s capacity 
to act as a spoiler in a number of areas and on a number of issues that are of vital national interest 
to Washington.  In our considered judgment, the choice is clear: the United States should pursue a 
sustainable cooperative relationship with Russia to advance vital American national interests, but 
do so without illusions regarding either Moscow’s sometimes neo-imperial ambitions, or the pace of 
democratic change in Russia.
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